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Abstract
This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment comparing voting behavior
and decision making e?ciency in standing and ad hoc committees, where decisions are
made by unanimity rule. We also compare sequential and simultaneous (secret ballot)
voting procedures. The data are remarkably consistent across treatments, in both quali-
tative (comparative statics) and quantitative terms. The di?erent procedures and the ad
hoc or standing nature of the committees generally do not seem to lead to the selection
of di?erent equilibria, with the exception of some evidence of bandwagon e?ects in the
sequential procedure.
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In the last decade, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat marquis de Condorcets
(1785) theory of committee decision making has emerged as workhorse model in political
economy, particularly voting theory. In its simplest modern formulation, the
Condorcet Jury Model(CJM hereafter) features a committee of size n that is faced
with a binary policy. The optimal policy is the same for all members, but depends on an
unknown state of the world. Each member of the committee receives some private
information about the state. The policy is determined by an election in which each
voter can vote for either alternative, and the prole of votes is aggregated into a group
decision according to some voting rule such as majority or unanimity with a status quo.
The voting procedure also species the order in which voters cast their votes.
In this framework, one can compare voting behavior and informational e¢ ciency
under alternative voting rules and procedures, a methodology referred to as the
information aggregation approach to elections. The past decade has produced a large
and growing set of results on this topic, under various modications to the basic CJM.1
This resurgence of interest in Condorcets approach was sparked by a key observation of
David Austen-Smith and Je¤rey Banks (1996) that naivevoting is generally not a
Nash equilibrium of the voting game. That is, the optimal way to vote in a multi-person
committee is not usually the same as the optimal way to vote in a committee of one, an
issue overlooked by Condorcet and other non-game-theoretic analysis of his model. In
fact, a voters strategic incentives generally depend on all the variables of the model: the
size of the committee, the voting rule and procedure, the information structure,
preferences, and so forth. Because such a simple model o¤ers rich insights into the
strategic considerations faced by voters, the CJM has played a prominent role in
enhancing our understanding of voting mechanisms.
1In addition to the other references in our introduction, see Timothy J. Feddersen and Wolfgang
Pesendorfer (1996, 1997), Andrew Mclennan (1998), Roger Myerson (1998), Michael Chwe (1999), Peter
Coughlan (2000), Arnaud Costinot and Navin Kartik (2007), and Dino Gerardi and Leeat Yariv (2007),
among others.
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However, some of the equilibrium properties of these common value elections can be
unintuitive. In a striking example of this, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998, FP
hereafter) have shown that in the context of juries for criminal trials, requiring a
unanimous vote for conviction may actually lead to more convictions than using
majority rule. Because such theoretical predictions and the equilibrium strategies that
underlie them are seemingly unnatural, they are particularly good candidates for
empirical testing. Unfortunately, testing the theory with eld data is virtually
impossible because of the sensitivity of the results to the exact parameters of the model,
and there are no obvious data sets available for such a purpose.2 Consequently, in this
paper, we adopt an experimental approach to understanding common value elections.
This paper examines two interrelated issues in the information aggregation
approach to voting. The rst question that we address is robustness. Since the goal of
the theory is to provide a general framework to analyze voting in committees, is it the
case that committees that are fundamentally di¤erent respond in similar ways to their
asymmetric information? We address this question by comparing decision making
under unanimity rule in ad hoc committees, like juries or expert panels, versus standing
committees, like boards of directors, judicial panels, or town councils. An important
di¤erence between the two is that ad hoc committees have a short life and address a
very limited set of issues (often only one, as with trial juries in the US), whereas
standing committees have a long life, and the members of the panel therefore engage in
a repeated game. Hence our rst question is: Do the theoretical predictions of the CJM
apply equally well (or equally poorly) to the behavior of ad hoc committees and to the
behavior of standing committees?
One reason to believe that there could be a di¤erence is that the CJM usually has
many equilibria. Broadly speaking, a common value election involves coordination
2The closest would be some data on real jury voting, but the details of the information structure is
not clear, and neither is the actual voting procedure used (since juries operate behind closed doors).
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among voters, and thus admits multiple equilibria which can be ranked by the Pareto
criterion. Moreover, when committee members vote sequentially, there are asymmetries
across voting positions which may be relevant to behavior. Indeed, it has been often
suggested that sequential voting would give rise to momentum e¤ects, where later voters
tend to follow the choices of earlier voters. Recent theoretical work on this question by
Eddie Dekel and Michele Piccione (2000) and S. Nageeb Ali and Kartik (2007) has
demonstrated that strategic voting in sequential elections can be both
history-independent and history-dependent.3 This leads to the second question: Can the
timing structure of the voting procedure lead to selection of di¤erent equilibria?
There have been only a few prior experimental studies of voting behavior in the
CJM.4 The most relevant for us is the rst study of strategic voting under unanimity
rule, by Serena Guarnaschelli, Richard D. Mckelvey, and Thomas R. Palfrey (2000,
GMP hereafter). They found that, consistent with equilibrium predictions, committee
members often voted strategically in the sense of sometimes casting a vote in
contradiction to their private information about the state of the world. GMP also found
that the comparative static predictions about the voter strategies under unanimity rule
were qualitatively correct (more strategic voting in larger committees), although the
changes in observed behavior were not as large as predicted by theory. An important
consequence of this deviation from equilibrium strategies was that many of the
predictions of FP with respect to information aggregation and e¢ ciency were rejected
by the data.
The GMP study only considered ad hoc committees which met once and then were
dissolved. In the study reported here, we attempt to replicate their results with standing
committees that meet repeatedly. Moreover, GMP only considered simultaneous voting.
3The aforementioned authors prove results for a wide class of voting rules, including unanimity rule,
which is our focus here. In the context of majority rule, see also Jörgen Wit (1997), Mark Fey (2000),
and Steven Callander (2007).
4See Angela Hung and Charles R. Plott (2001), Krishna Ladha, Gary Miller, and Joe Oppenheimer
(2003), and Jacob K. Goeree and Yariv (2007).
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Here, we compare behavior under sequential and simultaneous voting procedures.
I Experimental Design and Procedures
The laboratory study implemented several variations of the following game based on the
CJM. There is a committee (e.g., a jury) with n members. Nature randomly chooses a
payo¤-relevant state of the world, !, from the set 
 = fG; Ig, where Gstands for
Guilty and Ifor Innocent. Each state is chosen with equal probability. Members do
not observe the selection of the state, but each member, j, receives a private signal, sj,
about the state. Each signal sj 2 fg; ig is a conditionally independent Bernoulli random
variable where Pr (sj = gj! = G) = Pr (sj = ij! = I) = p > 12 . Each member j casts a
vote vj 2 fc; ag for one of two outcomes in X = fC;Ag, where Cstands for Convict
and Afor Acquit. There is no abstention. All the commitees reported in this study
operated under unanimity rule, which requires all n members to cast a c vote in order
for C to be the committee decision. Members have identical preferences which depend
only on the group decision and the state of the world: u (C;G) = u (A; I) = 1, and
u (C; I) = u (A;G) = 0.
Our experimental design has three treatment variables: committee size (n),
committee type (ad hoc or standing), and voting procedure. We consider committees of
two di¤erent sizes, n = 3 and n = 6, and two di¤erent voting procedures: simultaneous
voting and sequential voting. Simultaneous voting is like a secret ballot, where
individuals vote after receiving their private signals, but observing nothing else. In the
sequential voting procedure, members vote one by one in a pre-specied sequence, with
each voter observing the votes (but not the private signals) of those before them. In the
ad hoc committee treatment, subjects were randomly rematched into groups of size n at
the start of each period. In contrast, in the standing committee treatment, subjects
were randomly grouped at the start of the experiment, but the group composition
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remained constant during the entire experiment.
While our procedures are standard in experimental economics, there were several
di¤erences across treatments, including the subject pool, instructions, software, payo¤
salience, etc. The simultaneous ad hoc committee data are from the GMP study. The
sessions for that study were conducted in 1997 and used 48 Caltech subjects who
participated in 15 committees with unanimity rule.5 These sessions used a software
program written in C++. The sequential ad hoc committee data were collected at
UCLA in 2007, and in these experiments each subject participated in 30 committees.
These sessions were conducted using the JAVA-based Multistage program
(http://multistage.ssel.caltech.edu) and verbal instructions including overhead slides.
Finally, the standing committee data were collected at UCLA in 2003, using a Virtual
Basic program and online instructions.6 In these experiments, subjects made 30
committee decisions.7 The three programs di¤ered somewhat in the user interface for
entering decisions. As we will show below, the experimental results seem to be quite
robust to these variations in protocols and procedures.
In total, 222 subjects participated in the experiments (this includes the GMP
subjects). Average earnings in the UCLA experiments were $23:72, plus a xed showup
payment; the experiments lasted somewhere between 40 and 60 minutes.8
5Each of these subjects also participated in additional committees with di¤erent voting rules and
procedures, data that we do not use in this paper. See Guarnaschelli et al. (2000) for details.
6We would like to thank Jos Theelen for programming the standing committee experiments.
7In the UCLA experiments, subjects were recruited by mass email invitations to registered members
of a large subject pool of UCLA students, maintained by the California Social Science Experimental
Laboratory.
8In the UCLA sessions, subjects earned $1.00 for each correct committee decision and $0.10 for each
incorrect committee decision. In the GMP experiment subjects earned $0.50 for each correct decision
and $0.05 for each incorrect decision.
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II Results
We focus our discussion of the experimental results mainly on the di¤erences between ad
hoc and standing committees, dividing the presentation between simultaneous and
sequential voting. While we compare and contrast the behavior in di¤erent treatments,
we do not explictly test whether di¤erences in behavior are statistically signicant,
because observations of group behavior are potentially correlated across rounds.
Instead, the focus is on qualitative/economically substantive di¤erences. We discuss
this issue further in the nal section of the paper.
II.A Simultaneous Voting Procedure
First we ask: Is behavior di¤erent between ad hoc committees and standing committees
operating under unanimity rule with simultaneous voting? The top part of Table 1
answers that question with a clear no in terms of aggregate behavior. It reports the
fraction of observations where individuals voted to convict in each treatment, broken
down by whether they had received an innocent or guilty signal. The number of
observations is shown in parentheses. The last two rows of Table 1 show the predicted
frequencies of the unique responsive symmetric equilibrium, in which voters with guilty
signals always vote to convict, and voters with innocent signals vote to convict with
probability (n) 2 (0; 1).9 There is essentially no di¤erence between ad hoc and
standing committees in the probability of voting to convict with either a guilty or
innocent signal when n = 3, and only a negligible di¤erence when n = 6. We conclude
that the ndings of GMP are replicated almost exactly using standing committees
instead of ad hoc committees (and all the other procedural di¤erences). Note that there
is clear evidence of at least some strategic voting: regardless of treatment, a signicant
9Responsivemeans that a voters behavior is not independent of his signal. The GMP study used
slightly more informative signals (0.70 compared to 0.67). This results in negligible di¤erences in the
equilibrium, (n), as seen in the bottom two rows of Table 1.
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Guilty Signal (s = g) Innocent Signal (s = i) Guilty Signal (s = g) Innocent Signal (s = i)
Simultaneous Voting
Ad Hoc Committee 0.95 (174) 0.36 (186) 0.90 (186) 0.48 (186)
Standing Committee 0.94 (338) 0.35 (382) 0.94 (464) 0.52 (616)
Sequential Voting
Ad Hoc Committee 0.97 (231) 0.39 (200) 0.93 (317) 0.62 (286)
Standing Committee 0.98 (202) 0.44 (129) 0.98 (287) 0.50 (262)
Symmetric Equilibrium
p = 0.7 1 0.31 1 0.65
p = 0.67 1 0.32 1 0.66
Committee Size = 3 Committee Size = 6
Figure 1: Frequency of votes to convict by signal (number of observations in parentheses).
fraction of subjects vote to convict with an innocent signal. In the n = 3 cases, the
fraction is a bit higher than equilibrium predicts, whereas in n = 6, it is lower. In both
ad hoc and standing committees, the predicted comparative static, that (n) increases
with n; is observed.
Second we ask: Is information aggregation di¤erent in ad hoc committees and
standing committees? Because standing committees allow greater opportunities for
coordination, one may conjecture that such committees will aggregate information more
e¢ ciently than ad hoc committees. The top part of Table 2 shows the proportion of
correct group decisions (convicting the guilty or acquitting the innocent). On the whole,
we see at best limited support for this conjecture. In particular, there is virtually no
di¤erence in information aggregation between ad hoc and standing committees when
n = 6. When n = 3, ad hoc committees do better than standing committees in the G
state, and worse in in the I state: overall, the fraction of correct decisions in the ad hoc
committees is 57 percent, whereas it is 64 percent for standing committees. These
numbers can be compared with the predictions of the symmetric equilibrium and an
e¢ cient equilibrium, i.e. the one that maximizes the committees welfare, shown in the
bottom two rows in Table 2. The e¢ cient equilibrium highlighted in Table 2 is an
asymmetric equilibrium where two voters vote informatively (i.e., vote their signal),
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Convicting Guilty Acquiting Innocent Convicting Guilty Acquiting Innocent
Simultaneous Voting
Ad Hoc Committee 0.47 (57) 0.81 (63) 0.27 (26) 0.97 (34)
Standing Committee 0.39 (132) 0.94 (108) 0.27 (83) 0.99 (97)
Sequential Voting
Ad Hoc Committee 0.35 (167) 0.79 (106) 0.38 (210) 0.87 (150)
Standing Committee 0.50 (113) 0.78 (97) 0.33 (101) 0.87 (79)
Symmetric Equilibrium
p = 0.7 0.50 0.86 0.52 0.81
p = 0.67 0.46 0.84 0.48 0.79
Efficient Equilibrium
p = 0.7 0.49 0.91 0.49 0.91
p = 0.67 0.44 0.89 0.44 0.89
Committee Size = 3 Committee Size = 6
Figure 2: Correct decisions by state (number of observations in parentheses).
and all remaining voters convict regardless of signal.10
II.B Sequential Voting Procedure
We now turn to our sequential voting treatments, where votes are cast publicly one after
another. First we ask: Is behavior di¤erent between ad hoc committees and standing
committees operating under unanimity rule with sequential voting? To address this
question, we examine only those observations in which a voter does not already know
the outcome of the election, i.e. every preceding voter has voted to convict so far. This
is appropriate because once a voter votes to acquit, each subsequent voter is indi¤erent
between voting to convict and voting to acquit.
The bottom part of Table 1 lists the aggregate frequencies with which subjects vote
to convict given each signal for such undecided histories. This can be compared with the
symmetric, history-independent equilibrium of the sequential voting game (bottom row),
which simply replicates the symmetric equilibrium of the simultaneous game, an insight
10For our parameters, an alternative equilibrium in which one voter votes informatively and all remain-
ing voters vote to convict attains the same expected payo¤s as the e¢ cient equilibrium we describe in
Table 2. In this alternative equilibrium, convictions in the guilty state occur with the same probability
as acquittals in the innocent state, a feature not shared by our experimental data in any treatment.
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due to Dekel and Piccione (2000). The only substantial di¤erence across committee
types is in the six person treatments under innocent signals. In this case, subjects in
standing committees convict signicantly less than in ad hoc committees. In the
remaining three cases, there are only small di¤erences (n = 3, s = i and n = 6, s = g) or
virtually none (n = 3, s = g). Overall, at this aggregate level, the behavior of ad hoc
committees is closer to the predictions of the symmetric equilibrium.
Second we ask: Is information aggregation di¤erent in ad hoc committees and
standing committees? Here, we do nd some support for the conjecture that standing
committees would aggregate information more e¢ ciently than ad hoc committees,
although only for the smaller committee size (see Table 2). For the six-person
committees, there are only slight di¤erences in the probability of making the right
decision conditional on each state. For the three-person case, standing committees
appear to do signicantly better than ad hoc committees in the G state, but do
approximately well in the I state: overall, the fraction of correct decisions in the ad hoc
committees is 52 percent, whereas it is 63 percent for standing committees. Again,
these aggregate percentages can be compared with the predictions of the symmetric and
e¢ cient equilibrium that are listed in the bottom two rows of Table 2.
III Discussion
A remarkable feature of our data is the consistency or robustness across treatments.
Recall that the data were collected at various points in time, using di¤erent subject
pools, software, instructions, etc., and by di¤erent experimenters. Yet many features of
the data, e.g. the tendency to vote strategically after having received an innocent signal,
are similar across treatments, both in qualitative and quantitative terms. Furthermore,
we nd only minor di¤erences between ad hoc and standing committees, suggesting that
repeated interactions do not necessarily lead to the selection of di¤erent equilibria.
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While it is desirable to test whether the di¤erences across treatements are
statisticaly signicant, a challenge is that observations of group decisions are not
independent across rounds. To illustrate: in the standing committee decisions, the past
behavior by members of a group may inuence a subjects future behavior, thereby
making the groups decisions across rounds correlated. While the question of
signicance is important, and one that we hope to rigorously address in future work, the
similarity of both behavior and aggregate outcomes across ad hoc and standing
treatments is striking.
Interestingly, there are some di¤erences between the simultaneous and sequential
treatments that suggest the possibility of information cascades or momentum e¤ects
under the sequential voting procedure. Consider, for instance, the fraction of correct
outcomes for a committee of size six (see the right-most two columns of Table 2). Note
that sequential voting results in a higher percentage of convictions in both the innocent
and guilty states, possibly because later voters with innocent signals mimicked
predecessors who voted to convict. Indeed, although we do not report it here, the data
shows that this is often the case.
In future work, we plan to analyze how voting strategies vary with the voters
position under the sequential protocol. In particular, we will compare the
history-independent symmetric equilibrium (Dekel and Piccione, 2000) with the
history-dependent posterior based voting (PBV) equilibrium proposed by Ali and Kartik
(2007).11 Obviously, in the data there are some deviations that cannot be described by
either equilibrium, and we will employ a logit-QRE framework to allow for a maximum
likelihood comparison of history-dependent and history-independent voting.
11As Dekel and Piccione (2000) have pointed out, in unanimity games, the set of responsive equilibria is
identical under sequential and simultaneous voting. Nevertheless, the inherent asymmetry of positions in
a sequential procedure may make coordination on some asymmetric equilibria such as PBV equilibria
more salient. Moreover, we also plan to use majority rule data, where there are sequential voting
equilibria that are distinct from any simultaneous voting equilibrium.
10
References
[1] Ali, S. Nageeb and Navin Kartik (2007), Social Learning in Elections,mimeo,
University of California at San Diego.
[2] Austen-Smith, David and Je¤rey Banks (1996), Information Aggregation,
Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem,American Political Science Review,
90(1), 3445.
[3] Callander, Steven (2007), Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting,
Review of Economic Studies, 74(July), 653-84.
[4] Chwe, Michael (1999), Minority Voting Rights Can Maximize Majority Welfare,
American Political Science Review, 93(1), 8597.
[5] Costinot, Arnaud and Navin Kartik (2007), On Optimal Voting Rules under
Homogeneous Preferences,mimeo, University of California at San Diego.
[6] Condorcet, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat marquis de (1785), Essai sur
lApplication de lAnalyse à la Probabilité des Décisions Rendues à la Pluralité des
Voix, Imprimerie Royale, Paris.
[7] Coughlan, Peter (2000), In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials,
Communication, and Strategic Voting,American Political Science Review, 94(2),
375393.
[8] Dekel, Eddie and Michele Piccione (2000), Sequential Voting Procedures in
Symmetric Binary Elections,Journal of Political Economy, 108(1), 34 55.
[9] Feddersen, Timothy and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (1996), The Swing Voters Curse,
American Economic Review, 86(3), 408424.
[10] Feddersen, Timothy and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (1997), Voting Behavior and
Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information,Econometrica,
65(5), 10291058.
11
[11] Feddersen, Timothy and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (1998), Convicting the Innocent:
The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting,American
Political Science Review, 92(1), 2335.
[12] Fey, Mark (2000), Informational Cascades and Sequential Voting,mimeo,
University of Rochester.
[13] Gerardi, Dino and Leeat Yariv (2007), Deliberative Voting,Journal of Economic
Theory, 134(1), 317338.
[14] Goeree, Jacob K. and Leeat Yariv (2007), An Experimental Study of Jury
Deliberation,mimeo, Caltech.
[15] Guarnaschelli, Serena, Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey (2000), An
Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules,American Political Science Review,
94(2), 407423.
[16] Hung, Angela and Charles R. Plott (2001), Information Cascades: Replication and
an Extension to Majority Rule and Conformity-Rewarding Institutions,American
Economic Review, 91(5), 15081520.
[17] Ladha, Krishna, Gary Miller and Joe Oppenheimer (2003), Information
Aggregation by Majority Rule: Theory and Experiments,mimeo, Washington
University.
[18] McLennan, Andrew (1998), Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for
Benecial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents,American Political
Science Review, 92(2), 413418.
[19] Myerson, Roger (1998), Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury
Theorem,Games and Economic Behavior, 25(1), 111131.
[20] Wit, Jörgen (1997), Herding Behavior in a Roll-Call Voting Game,mimeo,
University of Amsterdam.
12
